Understanding identity changes in psychosis : a systematic review and narrative synthesis by Conneely, Maev et al.
Page 1 of 14
Schizophrenia Bulletin 
doi:10.1093/schbul/sbaa124
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf  of the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center.
MAJOR REVIEW
Understanding Identity Changes in Psychosis: A Systematic Review and Narrative 
Synthesis
Maev Conneely*,1, Philip McNamee1, Veenu Gupta2, John Richardson1, Stefan Priebe1, Janelle M. Jones3, and  
Domenico Giacco1,4
1Unit for Social and Community Psychiatry, WHO Collaboration Centre, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK; 
2Department of Primary Care and Mental health, Institute of Population Health, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK; 3Department 
of Biological and Experimental Psychology, School of Biological and Chemical Sciences, Queen Mary University of London, London, 
UK; 4Division of Health Sciences, Warwick  Medical  School, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
*To whom correspondence should be addressed; Unit for Social and Community Psychiatry, Newham Centre for Mental Health, 
London E13 8SP, UK; tel: +44 020 7540 4380 (ext.: 2308), fax: +44 020 7540 4380, e-mail: m.conneelymcinerney@qmul.ac.uk
Background and Objective: Experiencing psychosis can 
be associated with changes in how people see themselves 
as individuals and in relation to others (ie, changes in 
their identity). However, identity changes receive little 
attention in treatment, possibly due to a lack of clarity or 
consensus around what identity change means in people 
with psychosis. We aimed to create a conceptual frame-
work synthesizing how identity changes are understood 
in the psychosis literature.  Methods: Electronic data-
bases were searched up to April 2020. Studies about 
identity changes among people with psychotic disorders 
were analyzed using narrative synthesis by a collabora-
tive review team, including researchers from different 
disciplines, clinicians, and people who have experienced 
psychosis. Results: Of 10 389 studies screened, 59 were 
eligible. Identity changes are understood in 5 ways as (1) 
characteristics of psychosis, (2) consequences of altered 
cognitive functioning, (3) consequences of internalized 
stigma, (4) consequences of lost roles and relationships, 
and (5) reflections of personal growth. These 5 under-
standings are not mutually exclusive. Across a heteroge-
neous literature, identity changes were mostly framed in 
terms of loss. Conclusions: Our conceptual framework, 
comprising 5 understandings, highlights the complexity 
of studying identity changes and suggests important 
implications for practice and research. For clinicians, 
this framework can inform new therapeutic approaches 
where the experience and impact of identity changes are 
acknowledged and addressed as part of treatment. For 
researchers, the conceptual framework offers a way of 
locating their understandings of identity changes when 
undertaking research in this area.
Key words:  identity/self/schizophrenia/psychosis/
self-experience/self-disorder
Introduction
People’s sense of identity, or their sense of who they 
are as individuals and in relation to others, can change 
throughout their lives. Important transitions in life can be 
catalysts for identity change. Leaving secondary school 
to study at university,1 retirement from work,2,3 brain in-
jury,4 recovering from a stroke,5 and becoming a parent6 
are events where individuals may question who they were, 
who they now are, and who they might become.
Many people describe experiencing symptoms of psy-
chosis, as well as being diagnosed with a psychotic dis-
order, as having a profound impact on their lives and 
sense of identity.7–10 Traditional psychiatric models 
describe altered or disordered self-experience as ex-
periences involving a “deformed sense of first-person 
perspective.” 11 These experiences of identity change are 
thought to be useful in identifying psychosis, with some 
researchers arguing that schizophrenia should be re-
garded as a disorder of self-experience.12,13 The recovery 
approach does not share this view, but sees identity as an 
essential channel to recovery, which involves “rebuilding 
or redefining a positive sense of identity.” 12,14–28 These, 
and other approaches to studying identity changes, have 
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been compared and contrasted in existing reviews.23,27,29–31 
These different approaches, with their varying emphases 
and theoretical assumptions, have created division and 
limited knowledge sharing between research in the same 
broad area. To overcome these issues and move research 
forward, a conceptual framework is needed to bring to-
gether ways in which identity changes in psychosis are 
understood. 
The social identity approach (SIA), which origin-
ates from research in social psychology, may be useful 
in considering identity changes in psychosis. This ap-
proach, comprised of Social Identity Theory32 and Self-
Categorization Theory,33 argues that an important part 
of how we see ourselves comes from our belonging to, 
and our identification with, social groups.32,34,35 This un-
derstanding of identity is fluid and dynamic: as context 
changes, the way people see themselves and others also 
shifts.28 Research in this approach has shown that strong 
group identifications confer mental health benefits by 
giving people a sense of belonging, meaning and so-
cial support.36–40 Critically, this research has shown that 
changes in people’s lives can promote changes in their 
sense of identity and, through this, affect their mental 
health.1,4–6,39–50
There is currently no standardized framework for un-
derstanding identity changes in psychosis, despite the 
evidence that many people diagnosed with psychosis ex-
perience identity changes and indications that identity 
influences mental health. Understanding how identity 
changes are described may help clinicians’ and patients’ 
efforts to manage and make sense of identity changes and 
the impact these have on patients’ lives. We aim to sys-
tematically identify and synthesize research on identity 
changes in psychosis to create a conceptual framework 
of how identity changes are understood in the psychosis 
literature. The conceptual framework will be discussed 
using research from the SIA. This will further reduce 
barriers between disciplines and allow the understand-
ings of identity changes in the psychosis literature to be 
considered within the larger body of evidence from social 
psychology.
Methods
A systematic review and narrative synthesis was con-
ducted following the protocol developed according to 
the PRISMA guidelines51 and registered on PROSPERO 
(CRD42018058965). 
Worldview
This research was carried out within a pragmatic partic-
ipatory worldview. Rather than being exclusively posi-
tivist or constructivist, the pragmatic approach allowed 
multiple perspectives on reality to be used based on 
how helpful they are in addressing the research aim.52 
Participatory methods were equally influential in this 
project. People with experience of psychosis (V.G.  and 
J.R.) and people with experience of providing psychi-
atry treatment (D.G.  and S.P.) were involved, following 
existing guidance.53,54 The pragmatic participatory world-
view influenced the protocol design, choices of method, 
coauthors, advisory expert panels, and the choice of the-
oretical lens used to discuss the results.
Search Strategy
The search strategy spanned theoretical orientations and 
methods of studying identity changes by using a variety 
of data sources and terms to describe the sample of in-
terest (ie, people diagnosed with a psychotic disorder) 
and the phenomenon of interest (ie, identity change). 
Search terms included: “identity,” “self,” and “narrative” 
combined with words to describe the population such as 
“psychosis” and “voice hearer.” PubMed, PsycINFO, 
Web of Science, and CINAHL were searched from in-
ception until April 9, 2020. Gray literature (OpenGrey, 
GoogleScholar, and the British Library Catalogue) and 
reference lists of included studies were also searched (see 
supplementary material 1 for full search strategy).
Screening and Selection Criteria
We included qualitative and quantitative research that: 
(1) sampled adults (at least n = 3), where at least 50% of 
the participants were diagnosed with a psychotic disorder 
(F20-F29 in the International Classification of Diseases,55 
or equivalent) and (2) outlined a description (or model, 
framework, themes) of identity changes, broadly de-
scribed as modifications in the social positioning of the 
self  and other.24
Studies were excluded if  identity changes were: (1) 
exclusively understood as a trait or personality based 
(eg, agreeableness or extroversion), (2) not assessed as 
change (ie, identity measured at one time point only), 
or (3) studied exclusively via observers (eg, description 
from family members, researchers, or clinicians). Articles 
were also excluded if  they were books, chapters, disserta-
tions, theses, forensic samples, reviews, or opinion pieces. 
Reviews were excluded but their references were searched.
Eligibility was assessed by M.C. and P.M. using prede-
fined criteria published on PROSPERO. After duplicates 
were removed, a random sample of 20% of the identified 
texts was independently assessed for eligibility against the 
inclusion criteria by P.M. and M.C. Acceptable concord-
ance was predefined (90% agreement); 92% was achieved. 
Disagreements were resolved by consulting J.M.J.  and 
D.G.
Data Extraction
Data were extracted independently by M.C. and P.M. on 
a sample of 10% of the included studies to trial the 
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extraction sheet, which included study features, sample 
features (diagnoses and recruitment setting), and how 
identity changes were described. Quality assessment was 
not carried out as it is inappropriate when conducting an 
analysis of concepts.56,57
Data Synthesis and Analysis
To analyze the data, we modified the guidance on nar-
rative synthesis proposed by Popay and colleagues58 to 
include 3 rather than 4 stages: creating a preliminary 
synthesis, exploring relationships within and between 
studies, and assessing the robustness of the synthesis 
(figure 1). The first stage was omitted as it only applies 
to synthesizing interventions. We combined our narrative 
synthesis with elements of conceptual framework anal-
ysis.18,59 Specifically, we drew on the guidance on man-
aging sources of data, deconstructing concepts, and used 
techniques to integrate the synthesis into a conceptual 
framework, defined as “a network or a ‘plane’ of linked 
concepts.” 59 After carrying out an in-depth, inductive the-
matic analysis of the data extracted from the studies and 
mapping common concepts across studies, a conceptual 
framework was created and gradually refined (see supple-
mentary material 2). Throughout the analysis and devel-
opment of the conceptual framework of identity change, 
emerging ideas were discussed among the team. All au-
thors were involved in refining the conceptual framework 
and describing the understandings of identity changes. 
In line with our pragmatic participatory worldview, 2 
coauthors with lived experience of psychosis (V.G.  and 
J.R.) documented their thoughts on the emergent con-
ceptual framework, including how each understanding 
of identity change related to their personal experience of 
psychosis. These were collated and their reflections on the 
final framework are presented as part of the results. We 
used the SIA as a lens to discuss the findings.
Results
Of the 10 389 publications screened, there were 59 eligible 
studies (figure  2). The studies were published between 
1961 and 2020 and conducted in 14 countries, primarily in 
Europe (n = 28) and North America (the United States, n = 
15; Canada, n = 9), and the remaining (n = 7) from other re-
gions. Articles were written in 3 languages: English (n = 56), 
French (n = 2), and Spanish (n = 1). (The studies were ex-
tracted and translated into English by a native speaker and 
checked by a second native speaker.) Some studies explored 
the experience of identity changes and the meaning of iden-
tity changes to patients,60 while other studies explored the 
processes involved in identity changes (ie, its determinants 
and/or consequences),61 or combined both approaches.62 
There were 36 distinct operationalizations of identity, with 
few studies using the same theoretical understanding of 
identity change or sharing the same way of assessing iden-
tity change (all included studies can be found in table 3 in 
supplementary material 3). 
The conceptual framework comprises 5 ways of un-
derstanding identity changes (figure 3). Identity changes 
are understood as: (1) characteristics of psychosis, (2) 
consequences of altered cognitive functioning, (3) conse-
quences of internalized stigma, (4) consequences of lost 
roles and relationships, and (5) reflections of personal 
growth. Several studies described identity changes using 
more than 1 of the 5 understandings in the framework 
(figure 3; table 3 in supplementary material 3). The au-
thors with experience of psychosis echo this complexity, 
describing having experienced and made sense of identity 
changes in different ways (table 2).
Identity Changes Are Characteristics of Psychosis
The first way of understanding identity changes is as a 
personal or self-focused modification of how one experi-
ences oneself  as an individual. Here, identity change fo-
cuses on the self, and how a disruption in the self  has Fig. 1. Modified narrative synthesis process.
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an impact on how a person feels and behaves toward 
others. This change in self  is conceptualized as a “self-
disorder,” a deviation from normal functioning, which is 
determined by a trained psychiatrist applying a checklist, 
and/or in interviews with patients.11,63–66 The self  is seen as 
“anomalous,” “pathological,” and/or “fragmented,” and 
changing how an individual relates to others.67,68 There 
are several types of self-disorders, including a “sense of 
being alienated from oneself  and others,” “experiencing 
one’s self  as merged with the world,” and experiencing 
important changes in “values and/or perception of the 
self.” 69 Self-disorder is described as a fundamental fea-
ture of psychotic disorders; it is most typical of schizo-
phrenia and has been used to differentiate schizophrenia 
from other severe mental illnesses.31,63,70 Research sug-
gests that self-disorder is a marker of vulnerability for 
psychosis,71 a predictor of suicidality,72 related to the 
duration of untreated psychosis,73,74 and associated with 
cognitive impairment as measured by neurophysiological 
Fig. 3. Visual representation of the conceptual framework of 
identity changes in psychosis, showing interrelationships between 
the 5 understandings.
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Fig. 2. Flowchart of included studies.
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techniques.75 The change from normal self-experience to 
self-disorder comes about via intraindividual processes, 
(ie, independent of the person’s social environment) and 
is considered to be on a continuum with symptoms of 
psychosis: the difference between self-disorder and other 
symptoms is in quantity or severity, not quality.
Identity Changes Are Consequences of Altered 
Cognitive Functioning
The second way of  understanding identity change is as 
a consequence of  how people process and integrate cog-
nitive information.76,77 To maintain a sense of  identity, 
there is a need to bring together the different parts of 
how you see yourself, which involves accessing and in-
tegrating different cognitive processes.78,79 Based on re-
search showing people with psychosis perform less well 
on certain cognitive tasks, this literature explores these 
changed cognitive functions as the explanation and 
reason for identity changes. Processes studied included 
reflective function77—an individual’s ability to reflect 
on their and others’ thinking, meta-cognition80—an 
individual’s ability to think about their thinking, auto-
biographical memory81–83—an individual’s memories of 
significant events in their life’s narrative, and executive 
function83,84—the cognitive processes necessary for plan-
ning, monitoring and switching between tasks. Allé and 
colleagues84 found that patients’ ability to make connec-
tions between their life’s narratives and self-attributes 
was impaired compared with people without a diag-
nosis of  schizophrenia. Quantitative studies explored 
associations between cognitive functioning and iden-
tity change, with some studies finding support for their 
hypotheses,79,85 and others not finding any association 
between cognitive functioning and identity changes.82,86 
Qualitative studies also described cognitive capacities 
as necessary for the construction of  identity.77,84,87
Identity Changes Are Consequences of 
Internalized Stigma
The third way of understanding identity change is as a 
consequence of the internalized stigma related to psy-
chosis. Stigma can be attached to diagnosis, to treatment 
environments (eg, psychiatric hospitals), or to certain be-
haviors or circumstances related to diagnosis (eg, social 
withdrawal and unemployment).88,89 Stigma can be intern-
alized such that individuals believe that they are somehow 
tainted as a result of their condition.90 The internalization 
of stigma is typically rooted in exposure to societal be-
liefs over the course of a person’s lifetime, rather than as 
a consequence of illness. This means that negative beliefs 
about psychosis are likely to have existed before the onset 
of illness, but these only have an impact on an individual’s 
identity when they have received a diagnosis.66,91,92
A specific conceptualization of the impact of stigma 
on identity is “illness identity” where “illness defines the 
totality of a person’s being, and restricts all aspects of 
their lives,” and in its extreme, “engulfment,” “whereby 
illness and its associated stigma entirely define self-con-
cept.” 93 Being in hospital and taking medication were 
described as potential ways of increasing engulfment, as 
they act as symbols that patients are “entering a stigma-
tized class” both to themselves and to others.94
Identity Changes Are Consequences of Lost Roles and 
Relationships
The fourth way of understanding identity change is as 
a consequence of the loss of roles and relationships in 
people’s lives. Changes in where individuals work or live 
due to being hospitalized may lead to the loss of status 
and purpose if  they are unable to continue in their jobs, 
and separation or exclusion from relationships with 
friends, neighbors, colleagues, and family.62,95–97 Loss of 
these defining interactions can then promote identity 
change, especially when lost roles or relationships are not 
replaced with new ones. Corin62 suggests that “frequently 
hospitalized patients express a feeling of being ‘kept out 
of things’” at the interpersonal level. Roles and relation-
ships have also been described as important in inten-
tional, positive, identity changes. Connell explains: “The 
strengthening of relationships and return to familiar 
roles (e.g., work, study) and environments also helped to 
normalize the experience of self.” 60
Identity Change Reflects Personal Growth
The fifth way of understanding identity change is as a re-
flection of personal growth. Here, psychosis is associated 
with a meaningful transformation in an individual’s sense 
of self  and is understood as an evolution brought on by 
an event or experience in their lives. Identity change is not 
described as a negative, or as a loss, but rather is perceived 
as neutral or positive: the changed identity is a difference, 
rather than a deficit. Both identity change and psychosis 
are described as meaningful or “meant to happen.” In 
interviews about recovery and changes in self, one par-
ticipant said: “I guess all the bottled up trauma sort of 
came out. (…) I  think it was meant to happen. I  think 
I needed to go through that to get better.” Another par-
ticipant in the same study said “I think this happened for 
a reason, probably a good reason. (…) It gave me more 
self-knowledge I  guess.” 60 Jarosinski98 also presented 
identity changes as a gain rather than loss, noting that 
“Almost all participants verbalized that the experience, 
good or bad, made them more human.” 
Interrelationships Between Understandings. The 5 
understandings in the framework are not mutually ex-
clusive (overlaps in figure  3; supplementary material 
3). Articles that described identity changes in 2 or 3 
different ways often explained how these processes 
might interact. People might see identity change as 
primarily the result of  altered cognitive functioning, 
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ie, exacerbated by internalized stigma79. Changed cog-
nitive functioning might also lead to the loss of  roles 
and relationships, by changing how a person interacts 
with others.81,85 Articles focusing on one way of  un-
derstanding identity changes also reflected that other 
forms of  identity change may co-occur or interact with 
one another. Identity changes understood as charac-
teristics of  psychotic disorders were often considered 
alongside, or as a precursor of, other understandings 
of  identity changes. A disordered self  can not only pro-
mote identity change directly but it might also lead to 
identity changes by altering cognitive functioning,78 and 
increasing internalized stigma,67 or the loss of  roles and 
relationships.97 Stigma was a factor that many studies 
considered as also having an impact on identity, along-
side one of  the other understandings.61,62,79,98–100 There 
was no overlap between studies conceptualizing iden-
tity change as both a characteristic of  psychosis and 
a form of  personal growth, although personal growth 
did co-occur with other understandings in the frame-
work.60,101,102 Although the 5 understandings are not 
mutually exclusive, the small numbers in the overlaps 
in figure  3 show that most of  the research considers 
identity changes in a way that fits into a single under-
standing within the conceptual framework (with the 
exception of  internalized stigma, which is often con-
sidered alongside other understandings). 
Commonalities and Differences 
Loss Across 4 of  the 5 understandings, identity 
changes were described as negative, usually framed as 
a loss. This loss was described in indirect terms: iden-
tity change happens because of  a loss of  roles and re-
lationships or loss of  cognitive functioning following 
the onset of  psychosis. Loss of  identity, or “diminished 
self-experience,” was also described in direct terms as 
a part of, or a characteristic of, psychosis. Studies also 
described loss in more abstract terms, such as losing a 
positive sense of  self. Understanding identity changes 
as the result of  internalized stigma reflects this type of 
loss. Many articles did not explicitly refer to how loss 
came about, but the distressing symptoms of  psychosis, 
and/or diagnosis were consistently seen as a pivot point 
between different versions of  themselves.100 Many 
studies (n = 43) also described the possibility of  iden-
tity gain and positive identity changes. However, the 
initial change in identity was generally considered to 
be a loss. Studies that described identity change as per-
sonal growth (n = 8) were the only ones that included a 
description of  the initial identity change as neutral or 
positive.
Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Factors The 5 under-
standings of identity change focus on identity changes 
in either primarily intrapersonal (characteristics of 
psychosis, altered cognitive functioning, and personal 
growth) or primarily interpersonal terms (roles and rela-
tionships). Internalized stigma is the only understanding 
of identity change that involves change on both an in-
terpersonal level (becoming part of a stigmatized group) 
and an intraindividual level (the person internalizing 
stigma and applying it to themselves) (table 1). The ticks 
in table 1 show the features that are common to different 
understandings in the conceptual framework.
Reflections From Authors With Lived Experience. Two 
members of the review team documented their thoughts 
on the conceptual framework, based on their experiences 
of psychosis (V.G. and J.R.) (table 2).
Discussion
There is no standardized way of understanding identity 
changes in psychosis, and because of this, people ex-
periencing psychosis have few avenues to make sense of 
these changes. This review synthesized the available re-
search on identity changes to create a conceptual frame-
work. Identity changes in psychosis are understood as (1) 
characteristics of psychosis, (2) consequences of altered 
cognitive functioning, (3) consequences of internalized 
stigma, (4) consequences of lost roles and relationships, 
and (5) reflections of personal growth. In 4 of the 5 
understandings in the conceptual framework, identity 
change is described as a loss. This framework provides 
a way of considering these alongside each other in a 
transtheoretical and pragmatic way.
Table 1. Overview and Comparison Between Understandings
Characteristics 
of Psychosis
Altered Cogni-
tive Functioning
Internal-
ized Stigma
Lost Roles and 
Relationships
Personal 
Growth
Identity change is a loss ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Changes in identity can happen 
only after diagnosis
  ✓   
Primarily intrapersonal factors im-
plicated in identity change
✓ ✓ ✓  ✓
Primarily interpersonal (social) fac-
tors implicated in identity change
  ✓ ✓  
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Table 2. Reflections on the Conceptual Framework
Overarching Reflections
The understandings of identity change we identified in the literature replicate my experience of psychosis to some extent, and how my 
self-concept has changed over the course of my life since experiencing this. Some of these understandings I relate to more than others—eg, 
the more negative ones such as “characteristics of psychosis” do not speak to me as much as others. V.G.  
These understandings are useful because they invite you to think. Some I find more relatable than others. Nevertheless, they all help me to 
consider how I, and others with similar experiences, might relate to the world, opening up some potential for healing. Loss of identity al-
ways being described as negative is surprising. Maybe the loss of identity is not all bad. Loss is a part of life and a part of change. For me, 
the understandings can be ordered in how well they relate to my experience of identity change in the opposite order to how they appear in 
the text, with the fifth (personal growth) fitting best and the first (characteristics of psychosis) fitting the least well with my experience. J.R.
1.Characteristics of psychosis
Neither of us found this way of understanding identity change related to our experience, primarily because it seemed like the “problem” 
was located within the individual.  
This way of understanding identity change as self-disorder seems pathologizing. I think it does to some extent reflect my experiences, but 
the language of “anomalous” and “self-disorder” is very negative. Some of the descriptions do apply to how I experienced psychosis: when 
I was consumed by psychosis my whole reality was changed, which included how I saw myself. V.G.  
I am cynical of this way of understanding identity change. How can anyone objectively know or observe what normal self-experience is? It 
makes me uncomfortable that the change in identity can only be bad—in this case, not only bad but also a sign of “disorder.” That being 
said, there are aspects of the description of “self-disorder” that do speak to me. When I was in the psychosis, I felt merged and profoundly 
at one with the world and at the same time felt extremely alienated from the people around me. J.R.
2.Consequence of altered cognitive functioning
We had different reactions to this understanding of identity change.  
This understanding made sense to me. Looking back, there was no clarity in my cognitions at the time, which affected how I saw myself, 
and medication helped to bring clarity back into my thinking and bring me back to myself. Although I think it captures something I experi-
enced, I also think this understanding is a bit negative because it focuses on loss. V.G.  
I’m skeptical about the implied worldview in this understanding. I think not considering the environment loses sight of the real context that 
cognitions happen in, and also that research happens in. People currently in the psychosis might not see performing on a cognitive test as 
important. I think understanding changes in how you see yourself  as related simply to cognitive ability is reductive, paternalistic, and does 
not have helpful or positive implications for how I see myself. J.R.
3.Consequence of internalized stigma
We have both definitely seen the influence of stigma and internalized stigma, on our identities, and still see the impact it has on us.  
I think other people’s perceptions color the way you think about yourself  and this makes you feel different and inferior somehow. It was 
important for me to hold other identities, such as being a mental health professional and now a researcher, to think of myself  in a more 
positive way. This way of understanding identity change also shows how the environment and other people really influence how you think 
about yourself  and takes into account social inequalities and the environmental context that psychosis happens in, which, in my experience, 
is more accurate. I don’t think you can really separate the way you see yourself  from how other people see you, so of course, the stigma at-
tached to psychosis plays an important part in shaping my identity. V.G.  
The construct of internalized stigma shifts the blame to the person and away from the society it is created in. Discrimination happens, 
whether overt and obvious or more covert, and that affects how you relate to others and yourself. It changes the way I behave. I am over-
aware of how I might be coming across: I work too much or arrive places too early, I err toward apathy so my enthusiasm isn’t mistaken for 
mania. This awareness and attempt at managing how I appear to others is the result of stigma, and working to avoid fitting a stereotype, 
and to this day, it affects how I see myself  and my behavior. J.R. 
4.Consequence of lost roles and relationships
We have both felt that roles are important shapers of our identity—both losing and gaining relationships, whether this was related to psy-
chosis or other experiences, make us who we are.  
Having worked as an expert by experience for clinical psychology programs, I have come to identify with my diagnosis of psychosis due to 
the value this experience holds in educating trainee psychologists. My identity as a person with psychosis has provided me with a new role 
in life and has changed my self-concept positively, through feeling accepted within this role—although this was not the case when I was first 
diagnosed, in large part because of the stigma attached to the diagnosis. Through these roles, I came to see the identity of being a person 
with psychosis as positive and identified with it more over time. V.G.  
I’ve felt a type of grief  carried in the deaths of relationships and roles, in the possibilities that are lost when these connections disappear. 
How you relate to others makes up a lot of how you view yourself. I’ve lost certain roles and relationships, and others have been strength-
ened and formed because of my identity as a mad person, which is a positive identity for me now. J.R.
5.Reflection of personal growth
This way of understanding identity change made the most sense to us and we were surprised at how relatively uncommon it was in the literature. 
Understanding identity change as personal growth is my favorite way of conceptualizing identity change in psychosis that we found in the literature. 
I think that my unprocessed past manifested itself and resurfaced in the form of psychosis and this needed to happen for me to deal with the roots 
of the trauma I had experienced. The psychosis was almost a reflection of what I had previously experienced and I needed to face this to deal with 
the root cause. I agree that this needed to happen was inevitable and unavoidable. The change I experienced in my identity was an addition, not a 
loss, although it was distressing. The experience needed to happen to separate myself from psychosis and get myself back to myself. V.G.  
This is the understanding I found most alluring. I have always felt the psychosis was inevitable, like a volcano exploding or my life vomiting 
itself  up. The experience answered a lot of questions I had about my identity in life, took me to the limits of thought deviancy, and gave me 
a humility in how I look at reality. If  I give in to the full romanticism of it, I like to think it made me a better human, as it put me in touch 
with my own fragility. It was both painful and a type of growth. J.R.
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Strengths and Limitations
This is the first study to create a conceptual frame-
work of  identity changes in psychosis using a system-
atic approach. A particular strength is our focus on a 
predefined concept rather than on a word, meaning di-
verse approaches to the same subject matter could be 
considered together and included in the synthesis. As 
a result, the present synthesis cuts across disciplines, 
methodologies, and theories of  the nature of  identity 
and psychosis, allowing for a much-needed integration. 
A further strength lies in the way the analysis was car-
ried out, with input from a multidisciplinary, collabo-
rative team. This study has at least 3 limitations. First, 
it is possible that not all articles that describe a way 
of  understanding identity change were included. As we 
included a broad range of  terms for identity, to main-
tain sufficient focus, one of  these identity terms had 
to be found in the title for its abstract to be screened. 
Second, we were able to include only studies available 
in languages that use Latin script; therefore, we may 
have missed other extant understandings of  identity 
changes. Third, we used Western medical classification 
systems for the diagnostic inclusion criteria, thereby 
situating our work within Western, medicalized under-
standings of  psychosis. There is research indicating 
that certain nonmedical understandings of  psychotic 
experiences involve identity changes and loss of  sense 
of  self.103 To address these limitations, future research 
should explore identity changes in different cultures 
and consider nonmedical explanatory models for psy-
chotic experiences. 
Interpreting the Framework From a Social Identity 
Approach
The conceptual framework of identity changes in psy-
chosis can be understood through the lens of the SIA, 
specifically the social identity model of identity change 
(SIMIC).104 According to this model, people can maintain 
health and well-being after important life changes to the 
extent that they can maintain old social group member-
ships or gain new social group memberships.1,5,4–6,41–50,104 
Social groups have well-being benefits because they pro-
vide a basis for identification: with identification comes 
a shared sense of meaning and purpose, increased ori-
entation to other ingroup members, and increased access 
to social support.47,105–107 Conversely, losing social group 
memberships can have a negative impact on mental 
health, as people no longer have access to these psycho-
logical resources. The SIMIC captures, and helps explain, 
a possible mechanism for a common understanding of 
identity changes: as consequences of lost roles or relation-
ships. Considering the conceptual framework through 
the lens of the SIA reveals notable gaps in the way iden-
tity changes have been studied in psychosis. For example, 
using the SIA, research has found that having compatible 
(nonconflicting) identities is an important predictor 
of better mental health.1 Changes in people’s lives may 
lead to seeing themselves as belonging to a new group or 
gaining an identity. This new identity being added (eg, 
being a patient) may be experienced as conflicting with 
a person’s existing identities. None of the reviewed arti-
cles explored the conflict between identities as a factor in 
identity changes that might impact people’s lives.
Second, the SIA can help us to understand how 
identity change may be a consequence of  internalizing 
stigma. Research has shown that people are less likely 
to identify with a group that is stigmatized and that 
belonging to a group that is discriminated against and 
negatively valued can be detrimental to well-being. 
People cope with belonging to a negative group in 
different ways depending on whether the group is 
“achieved” (not assigned at birth) and whether it is 
seen as “permeable” (how possible or easy it is to leave 
the group).108,109 If  a group is both achieved and perme-
able, its members are more likely to attempt to distance 
themselves from the group when it is negatively evalu-
ated. Research in psychosis shows that people attempt 
to distance themselves from a schizophrenia diagnosis 
and often do not identify with it.110,111 Attempting to 
manage and maintain a positive sense of  identity may 
help explain the large proportion of  people with se-
vere mental illnesses that disengage from and receive 
inconsistent support from services.112–114 Coming to see 
a diagnosis in a way that is positive may allow people 
to experience the positive effects of  belonging and ac-
cess more sources of  support.115 In addition, the stigma 
attached to other identities may leave people vulner-
able to poorer mental health and paranoia.116,117 For 
example, research among Black Britons found that 
identifying more with their racial identity was associ-
ated with higher levels of  paranoia if  their interactions 
with White Britons were mostly negative.118 This sug-
gests that when individuals have a stigmatized identity, 
experiences of  prejudice and discrimination related to 
that identity can result in mental distress.
Third, the SIA can help us to understand identity 
change as altered cognitive functioning. Various cognitive 
abilities are required for people to categorize themselves, 
others, and themselves in relation to others: if  these cog-
nitive abilities are changed or impaired, this will affect 
people’s ability to integrate different social identities into 
their sense of self.34,108
Fourth, the SIA does not suggest that all changes in 
identity are negative, but rather risky or pivotal times, 
when identities might be lost or gained. This means the 
SIA is compatible with understanding identity change as 
personal growth.
Different to the other 4 understandings, identity 
changes as characteristics of psychosis see identity change 
as “a constitutive phenotype of schizophrenia,” an inte-
gral part of psychosis rather than as a consequence of 
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it.12,19,119–121 This implies a closer association between 
managing identity changes and treating psychosis than 
in the other understandings. Critics have argued against 
the idea that “anomalous self-experiences” are a part of 
illness, proposing that these may be the result of power 
asymmetries occurring in clinical encounters.100,121–124
Implications
Although it is known that there are multiple ways of 
understanding identity changes in psychosis,23,26,30 our 
review provides the first conceptual framework for organ-
izing these ideas across disparate literature. This frame-
work offers insights into clinical and research settings 
by identifying and integrating potential mechanisms for 
interventions.
For clinicians, it is important to be aware that pa-
tients may experience identity changes as positive, neg-
ative, or neutral. Clinicians may have to adapt their 
therapeutic approaches to align with how patients 
make sense of  their experiences. The understandings 
included in the framework could also help us identify 
how clinical interventions could help. Certain forms 
of  psychotherapy have been designed to support pa-
tients with alterations in specific cognitive functions, 
such as metacognition, showing improvement in symp-
toms, social functioning, and self-experience.125–135 
Interventions targeting stigma in the general public 
and internalized stigma may also support patients in 
having a more positive sense of  self.136–143
For researchers, the framework can be used as a ref-
erence point for future studies, increasing transparency 
and allowing comparisons. Researchers may focus on 
one understanding from the framework or integrate 
different understandings of identity change. More re-
search into identity changes as reflections of personal 
growth is needed, as well as research considering how 
power imbalances in society and in psychiatric settings 
might impact identity and health. In addition, the 5 
understandings in this conceptual framework should be 
explored in first-person accounts of psychosis, as the re-
search synthesized here is unavoidably influenced by the 
questions and assumptions of the researchers who wrote 
the included articles.
Although there are numerous existing approaches 
to identity change in psychosis,23,120,135,144,145 which pro-
vide valuable insights, we contend that there is value in 
adopting a social identity approach in future empirical 
research. The SIA provides a way of integrating all 5 
understandings of identity changes in psychosis within 
a single overarching theory, which will allow unex-
plored questions to be investigated (eg, the role of con-
flict between identities). As paranoia is one of the most 
common experiences in people when first diagnosed with 
psychosis,146 research into paranoid feelings in nonclin-
ical populations is a useful indicator for clinical research. 
Using the SIA, researchers have found that identifying 
more strongly with a group (specifically: family, nation-
ality, and neighborhood groups) is linked to fewer para-
noid feelings.116,117,147
Conclusions
This systematic review and narrative synthesis presents a 
conceptual framework of how identity changes in psychosis 
are understood. The understandings stem from different 
theoretical frameworks that are occasionally dissonant and 
represent a range of patient experiences and approaches. 
Clinicians should be aware of the different ways of un-
derstanding identity changes and remain flexible when ex-
ploring patients’ experiences. This review provides a first 
step through synthesizing existing research and providing 
a straightforward framework of 5 understandings, which 
both patients and clinicians can use to help think and talk 
about identity changes in psychosis.
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